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The Bolar Amendment Abroad:
Preserving the Integrity of American
Patents Overseas After the South
African Medicines Act
Recent advancements by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
have been nothing short of amazing. Perhaps more than any other
development, the current generation of AIDS therapies is an
example of the benefits delivered by this industry. By relegating
HIV and AIDS to the status of a controllable disease, millions of
people will be able to live productive lives where just a decade
earlier they would have been facing almost certain death. "Drug
cocktails" of the latest and most innovative medicines can save
lives, but at a cost; these regimens can run as much as $12,000 per
year per patient.1 With the average African nation spending as
little as $10 per person on health care each year, any hope of
securing new, more effective HIV/AIDS drugs does not exist.
2
In response to the growing AIDS crisis in the country, the
South African Parliament introduced legislation that provides
their country with opportunities to obtain lower cost versions of
the latest U.S. drugs and make them widely available. The 1997
South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Act
Amendments ("Medicines Act") -specifically section 15C-gave
the Health Minister power to ensure that international patent
rights over any medicine did not stop the South African
government from issuing licenses to produce that same medicine
locally.' The legislation also provides for the parallel importation
of drugs from other countries that produce them inexpensively,
such as India.4
1. Ralph Nader, In the Public Interest, HEALTH LETrER, June 1, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 13846869.
2. Gumisai Mutume, Trade: U.S. Drug Companies Ease Up On South
Africa, Inter Press Service, Sept. 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 27373954.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Claiming that their patent rights, as protected by the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") agreement of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") treaty, were violated, the
U.S. and European pharmaceutical industries erupted in protest
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") brought suit against South Africa to have these new
laws struck down, and asked the WTO to intervene and compel
South Africa to honor its TRIPS agreements.6
This comment traces the origins of the WTO and TRIPS
agreements and the Hatch-Waxman Act, also known as the "Bolar
Amendment" in the U.S., that deals with modifying pharma-
ceutical patents. Applying those legal constructs to the AIDS
crisis in South Africa and the recent Medicines Act intellectual
property dispute, the author proposes a way of applying patent
exceptions that have been developed in the United States to
international trade agreements. Some observers have recom-
mended introducing a version of the U.S. Orphan Drugs Act to
the WTO, but this would not address many of the widespread
diseases that affect millions of people in South Africa and around
the world.7
Pitting the economic and political might of the United States
and Europe against the impoverished, suffering population of
South Africa exposes several fundamental flaws in the current
world trading system. Much of the criticism the WTO and GATT
attracted in the past was the inability of humanitarian interests to
rival economic concerns at the negotiating table in situations like
South Africa. Less developed countries ("LDCs") often point to
situations like the current AIDS crisis as examples of why they
should not be required to adhere to conventions like the WTO.
In the end, free-trade and Western style capitalism seem
destined to be the most effective method of improving lifestyles
and encouraging innovation, but in the short term many barriers
5. Marcus Marby, Give Us This Day Our Daily Meds, Newsweek
International, July 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8074144.
6. Mutume, supra note 2.
7. Jeremy Lovell, Drug Firms Refuse to Yield in SA Patent Row at
http://www.woza.co.za/reuters/nov98/patento.html (last modified Nov. 13, 1998).
The Orphan Drug Act provides up to seven years of exclusivity for medicines
developed to treat diseases that affect less than 200,000 people. This was
designed to encourage the pharmaceutical industry to research diseases that
otherwise would not have a large enough potential market to warrant a costly
research program. Often, the populations of less developed countries suffer
greatly from diseases not prevalent in the industrialized West (like malaria), and
have benefited from drugs developed under the Orphan Drug Act.
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remain to be overcome, especially in the LDCs. By ignoring the
potential backlash that strict patent enforcement may unleash in
situations like South Africa, the Western industrial nations are
failing to address an essential component of effective trade
management. The future of the WTO as a capable instrument for
managing world trade is jeopardized when nations are forced into
unpopular and potentially harmful positions. Only when the
people and governments of all nations involved in international
trade feel they are treated fairly will there be long-term stability in
the system.
Even within the United States and other affluent Western
nations there is widespread opposition to trade. As the recent
violence at the WTO meeting in Seattle demonstrated, people of
even the most prosperous countries feel threatened by supra-
national, non-elected governmental bodies. Whether it is the
supposed lack of accountability of organizations like the WTO or
opposition to policy goals of treaties like TRIPS, the Seattle
experience illustrated how fragile international trade institutions
can be. Defending these establishments should be a priority for
the U.S.
Protectionist forces and special interests have been able to
force the U.S. government into unilateral trade actions that have
often rankled our trading partners. The coming years will require
a harmonization of U.S. trade policy with the demands of
established international trade bodies to ensure both the survival
of these bodies as effective governing entities and an American
ability to address concerns like the environment and human rights
abroad. Without legitimate, neutral bodies like the WTO,
political pressures may force more states to turn to harmful
unilateral actions like the South African Medicines Act without
fear of a unified punitive response from the international
community. The United States needs to lead in this instance to
8. See generally Marcus Noland, Learning to Love the WTO, Foreign
Affairs, Sept./Nov. 1999, at 78. Arguing that the United States needs to accept a
greater leadership role within the WTO specifically, the author describes the
current state of American trade policy as a "road to nowhere." Protectionist
tendencies in the United States need to be held at bay, and the article implies
that strengthening international trade bodies will accomplish this by providing a
legitimate and internationally recognized vehicle for American policy goals and
by preventing the American government from being able to unilaterally alter
trading policies based on internal politics. A strong trade system where all
participants-especially the United States-is in our best interest as it will deter
unilateral actions by other countries that may be harmful to trade. In the long
run, an "anarchic" trade policy by the United States will benefit no one.
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prevent others from following the route South Africa has taken.
This comment suggests steps towards demonstrating that leader-
ship while simultaneously removing a threat to the organized
trading system that provides many benefits around the world.
While there are many aspects of international trade and its
social impacts that are beyond the scope of this limited exam-
ination, the South African AIDS crisis illustrates where there is a
need for a reevaluation of the human impact of trade. The United
States in particular has acted to provide quick, inexpensive access
to generic drugs for its citizens, but has denied comparable access
to citizens of other nations. This must change to ensure the long-
term stability of an international trading system. Only by giving
all of the signatories of the WTO a stake in the continued success
of the trading system can we expect to make progress in defending
aspects of trade like intellectual property. A modification of the
TRIPS treaty to allow easier access by LDCs and other poor
nations, like South Africa, to essential medicines will solidify
support for the WTO and intellectual property rights across the
board.
Beginning with the emergence of the current generation of
trade treaties and the situation that has developed in South Africa,
this comment will illustrate the possibilities for change that exist in
the WTO/TRIPS regime. This complex problem contains
economic, political and moral elements, and this comment will
address all of these aspects. Perhaps no other current human-
itarian crisis in the world today has the long-term destabilizing
potential that the AIDS epidemic does, and as a result must be
dealt with soon.
I. Origins and Background of TRIPS
A. History of GA TT, the World Trade Organization and TRIPS
When examining General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
("GATT"), the forerunner of the WTO and TRIPS agreements, it
is important to consider the economic and political climate in
which the treaties developed. Essentially an outgrowth of the
Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 that established a framework
of international economic cooperation,9 GATT emerged in 1947 as
the agreement on international tariffs, a primary consideration in
9. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 36 (1997).
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any trading system."° The goal of this treaty was to promote
international free trade while protecting the interests of both
developed and developing nations. Many of the leaders involved
in forming the post-war international economic system viewed the
breakdown of international trade during the Great Depression as
one of the key contributors of instability that lead to the Second
World War.' Despite being established by many countries to
protect their local industries from competition as the world
economy collapsed, retaliatory trade barriers were seen as having
contributed to the severity of the depression." The economic
blunders of the inter-war period (1920 to 1939), especially the
highly protectionist U.S. tariff act in 1930, were seen as mistakes
not be repeated again. 3 The importance that was attached to
reforming the world economy to avoid similar catastrophes cannot
be underestimated.
It is interesting to recognize that the notion of free trade and
patent protection as they exist today is a relatively new
phenomenon. The patent is, inherently, a limited monopoly, and
the idea of strict government enforcement of such an idea would
have seemed outrageous to many of the American Founding
Fathers. 4 It has only been in the last half of the twentieth century,
since World War II, that the push for more secure and stable
international trading systems, and the emergence of the hyper-
connected international economy, have necessitated strict
intellectual property protections.
1. GATT and WTO-Trade regulation today traces its roots
back centuries, with the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 being described
as the a "forerunner" of GATT." However, it was not until World
War II that we see the emergence of modern trade policies.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 38.
12. Id. at 36.
13. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 37.
14. See generally, A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a Polite Form
of Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (quoting the Supreme
Court holding in Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1982), in which the
Court described the ideas of Thomas Jefferson as: "reject[ing] a natural rights
theory in intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the social and
economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed
to secure to the inventor[s] ... natural right[s] in [their] discoveries. Rather it
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.").
15. WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, 40-45 (1964).
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Along with the United Kingdom, the United States took the
lead working to establish a secure world economy following the
war.16 After the signing of the GATT in October of 1947, one of
the first developments to emerge from these economic summits
(now commonly referred to as "rounds") was the creation of the
International Trade Organization ("ITO") in 1948.17 While the
GATT was not intended to be a physical organization, the ITO
was to be the vehicle for stimulating the world economy and
trade."i As the ITO was never ratified by the U.S. Congress (and
ultimately doomed by this rejection), GATT served as the main
vehicle for addressing issues of international trade. 9
As the decades progressed and international trade grew,
becoming more complex, several attempts were made to establish
a successor organization to GATT that could deal with the new
intricacies of modern commerce. The push for a new trade
organization became increasingly strong after the Tokyo Round of
GATT conferences in 1979, when it became clear that the trade
regulations needed to be revamped.'
Finally, when the Uruguay Round began in 1986, there was
movement towards the creation of an international body designed
to effectively regulate trade.2 The United States, under the
leadership of an actively pro-trade Clinton administration, finally
signed the GATT in 1994, and then accepted the WTO agreement
that emerged a year later.22 A product of perhaps the most
complex international treaty ever produced, the WTO (whose
charter incorporates much of the text from the earlier GATT
16. Id.
17. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 39.
18. Id. at 38.
19. Ned Milenkovich, Note, Deleting the Bolar Amendment to the Hatch-
Waxman Act-Harmonizing Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in a Global
Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, N. 35 (quoting MICHAEL BLAKENEY,
TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE
GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 31-33 (1996).)
20. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 44.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 46. This period of intense activity surprised many observers and
was the result of intense efforts, by both the GATT organization and the leaders
of the various nations that ratified the new treaties. Different factions within the
international trade community lobbied for slightly different versions of what
would become the WTO. The Uruguay round did not begin with the explicit
purpose of creating a new regulatory body. After enactment of the WTO in
1994, it had a year of overlap with the GATT, which effectively expired at the
end of 1995, despite the "de facto" application of many of its provisions to trade
regulation even today.
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agreements) is a dispute resolution forum for international trade
conflicts.23 Importantly, the WTO operates independently of other
governmental bodies, and establishes its laws and regulations at
regular ministerial conferences (such as the recent, ill-fated Seattle
conference).2' As a truly international body capable of policing
itself and imposing regulations that can supercede the laws of
sovereign states, the WTO has developed into the leading
international trade organization in the world.
2. TRIPS-One of the most important features to emerge
out of the Uruguay Round was the TRIPS agreement. A
sweeping intellectual property agreement, TRIPS is the section of
the GATT that outlines international patent rights.26 Section 5,
Articles 27-34, outlines the member states' responsibilities
regarding international patents and the protections afforded
them.27 Interestingly, the TRIPS agreement contains, in Article
31, an exception for countries to violate international patent rights
in times of national emergency.28 Aside from this exception, the
TRIPS treaty holds member states to a very high level of patent
protection. The treaty currently mandates a patent protection
period of twenty years, longer than the similar time required by
the U.S. at the time of the Uruguay Round.29 The Agreement
enumerates the following rights for patent holders:
Rights Conferred
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive
rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to
prevent third parties not having [the owner's]
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that
product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to
prevent third parties not having [the owner's]
consent from the act of using the process, and from
the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or
23. Id. at 15.
24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Treaty].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 93-97.
28. Id. at 95(b).
29. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 313.
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importing for these purposes at least the product
obtained directly by that process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or
transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude
licensing contracts.0
One of the reasons intellectual property rights were pushed
into the GATT framework (and later the WTO inherited this
responsibility) was the need for an effective dispute resolution
mechanism.3  In the recent South African Medicines Act
altercation, one of the first responses by the U.S. government, on
behalf of the pharmaceutical industry, was to request that the
WTO intervene in the controversy to resolve the conflict.32
3. Technical aspects of TRIPS Relating to Pharmaceutical
Patents- Building on the earlier cornerstones of international
patent law, TRIPS places several more layers of obligations on the
member states than did the Paris and Berne Conventions that
protected industrial and literary/artistic patents, respectively.33 All
of the substantive aspects of the previous conventions are included
in the TRIPS accord.' 4 The agreement is a "minimum standards"
treaty, defining the base of acceptable intellectual patent
protection that any WTO member state may provide.35
The basis for international patent protection under TRIPS is
the requirement that all products and processes, in all fields of
technology and industry, be afforded full patent protection by all
member states, regardless of which country developed it.' There
are certain exceptions to this rule. They include preventing the
issuance of a patent if doing so world result in severe environ-
mental damage, allowing access to new surgical advancements and
other, albeit limited, exceptions where it would offend the order
public to insist on patent protection.37
For the entire twenty-year period of protection, the owners
have the exclusive right to assign, transfer, and license their
30. TRIPS Treaty, supra note 24, at 94 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 311.
32. Gumisai Mutume, TRADE: U.S. Companies Ease Up on South Africa,
Inter Press Service, Sept. 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 27373954.
33. World Trade Organization, An Overview of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Overview],
http://www.wto.org/wto/intellec/intell2.htm.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. TRIPS Treaty, supra note 24, at 93-94.
37. Id., art. 27.2.
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patent." Member states of the WTO are bound by TRIPS not to
interfere with the rights of a patent holder, unless such action
would not prejudice the rights of and prevent the reasonable
exploitation of the patent by its owner." It is difficult to see how
the patent nullification aspects of the South African Medicines
Act would not violate this clause of the treaty.40
The South African Act also provided for compulsory
licensing (forcing a patent holder to provide licenses for
production to local producers before the expiration of a patent),
which is permitted by TRIPS, but subject to certain restrictions.
Any patent holder subject to these licensing requirements should
be compensated according to the economic value of the license,
and there must also be an attempt made to agree to reasonable
42terms for a voluntary licensing agreement. South Africa made
none of these allowances.
One of the areas where the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
claimed the South Africans violated TRIPS was Articles 39.3 and
41 et seq.43 These provisions of the treaty require that the patent
holder's trade secrets and other undisclosed information be
protected by member states (Article 39.3) and that effective
remedies must be available to combat patent infringement
(Article 41). 4
Interestingly, there are provisions in the TRIPS treaty for a
transitional period for LDCs. 45 Recognizing the need for these
generally poorer nations to ease into heightened patent protection
rather than cutting themselves off from certain technologies
immediately, the treaty allows a five year transition period ending
on January 1, 2000.46 Even after this transition period has ended,
certain LDCs may petition for an additional five-year extension in
certain essential fields, such as pharmaceuticals due to the
overwhelming need for many medicines.4 ' However, these
38. Id., art 28.
39. Id.
40. PhRMA, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
(NTE) at http://www.searchforcures.com/issues/intl/safrica.html (last modified
Nov. 16, 1999).
41. TRIPS Treaty, supra note 24, art. 31.
42. Id.
43. PhRMA, National Trade Estimate Report On Foreign Trade Barriers
(NTE), supra note 40.
44. TRIPS Treaty, supra note 24, art. 39.3, 41 et seq.
45. Id., arts. 65, 66 et seq.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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extension provisions have not modified South Africa's treaty
responsibilities. '8
II. The Hatch-Waxman Act ("The Bolar Amendment")
Despite the hard-line position that the U.S. government has
taken in regards to enforcing its citizen's patent rights abroad, it
maintains a very different position at home-at least in regards to
pharmaceuticals. The Hatch-Waxman Act, otherwise known as
the "Bolar Amendment," has been criticized both in the U.S. and
abroad, but its impact on the drug market has been undeniable.
This section examines the history and application of the Bolar
Amendment to U.S. pharmaceuticals.
A. Background of the Bolar Amendment
According to federal law in place since the early 1960s,
generic drug companies were forced to conduct their own research
and development into a drug that had previously been developed
and marketed by a leading research company.4 9 Because of the
original manufacturer's patent on the drug, the generic company
was required to wait until the expiration of the first patent held by
the creator of the drug, and then duplicate all of the research."0
This federally mandated redevelopment of an existing drug could
delay by years the amount of time it would take for a less
expensive generic version to become available on the market.
In 1983, Roche Products, Inc, one of the largest primary
research drug companies in the world, sued a generic drug
producer, Bolar Pharmaceutical Company, in federal court for
patent infringement.51 At issue was research being conducted by
Bolar to analyze a sleeping pill patented by Roche in order to
allow the rapid development of a generic version by Bolar after
48. PhRMA, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
(NTE), supra note 40 (describing the Medicines Act as violating South Africa's
obligations under the TRIPS agreement and advocating punitive action by the
United States and the WTO).
49. Federal Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1999). This statute
describes patent infringements as any research done for the purposes of
"manufacture, use, or sale" of a drug before the expiration of a current patent,
subject to penalties to be ascribed by law. This allowed no exception for generic
manufacturers to test a drug in order to allow preparation for FDA approval and
marketing after the expiration of the original patent.
50. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
51. Id.
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the expiration of the existing patent. 2 Essentially admitting that
their actions constituted patent infringement under the letter of
the law, Bolar contended that their research should be permitted
because no profit will result from it until after the expiration of the
Roche patent.53 The district court agreed, holding that any other
conclusion would be to grant a de facto extension of the patent
held by Roche (which, in 1983, ran for seventeen years). Despite
the subsequent reversal of this decision on appeal, 5 the stage had
been set for action by the federal government.
B. Federal Action and the Creation of the Bolar Amendment
Recognizing the potential benefits of allowing generic drug
companies to conduct research before the expiration of a patent to
allow for expedited FDA market approval of their drug, Congress
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act.56 This legislative act reversed the
ruling by the Federal Circuit Court and extended an exception to
the U.S. generic pharmaceutical industry in patent law that no
other industry enjoys.57 In a speech supporting the amendment,
Representative Henry Waxman of California, one of the bill's co-
sponsors, stated "it provides low-cost generic drugs for millions of
Americans, saving maybe a billion dollars over a several year
period....",8
C. International Implications of the Bolar Amendment
The European reaction to the Bolar Amendment has been
overwhelmingly negative. The European Court of Justice has held
that actions like those allowed under the Amendment are patent
52. Id. at 257.
53. Id.
54. Roche, supra note 50, at 258. The district court also determined that the
infringement was de minimus and would not result in any financial harm to
Roche. Limiting its holding to research only, the court held open the possibility
of damages to Roche if they could show any financial harm before the expiration
of the patent.
55. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the research conducted by Bolar was a "violation of the patent laws
in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,"' and had substantial "commercial purposes.").
56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (providing that it "shall not be an act of
infringement to make, use, offer to sell within the United States or import into
the United States a patented invention... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .....)
57. Milenkoich, supra note 19, n.78.
58. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857 at 14 (1984).
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infringement. 9 The main concern arising from Bolar is whether
this is an infringement of the TRIPS agreements, of which the U.S.
is arguably the key signatory and supporter. The inconsistencies
that the Bolar Amendment creates in global patent policy make it
more difficult to enforce international protection of intellectual
property, not only for pharmaceuticals, but also other industries
such as computer software.'
U.S. trade policy should act to prevent unilateral actions by
other nations that could threaten the security of American
patents; the most effective way for the U.S. to accomplish this goal
is by leading by example." A main goal of the WTO and its
member states should be the maintenance of the intellectual
property provisions currently available.
III. The Current AIDS Crisis in South Africa and the Medicines
Act
Unilateral steps such as the abrogation of intellectual
property agreements have occurred before. Faced with a human-
itarian crisis, many countries feel compelled to act expeditiously,
in ways that harm them and their trading partners in the long run.
However, the scale of the suffering in South Africa is incredible,
and the situation continues to deteriorate every day. Currently
one of every eight South Africans is infected with HIV, with that
number continuing to rise.62 The inability for a country like South
Africa to cope with these numbers of infected persons can be
politically, socially and economically destabilizing. The traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO that resolve any
TRIPS disputes may take months or years to complete, and in the
meantime, understandably, South African government has felt
compelled to act.
59. IPL Newsletter, Judgment of EU Court on Generic Medicines and Patent
Rights, Summer 1998, at 47.
60. J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1996) (describing actions by
the U.S. that undermine the agreement while demanding strict adherence to the
agreement by other nations).
61. Marcus Noland, Learning to Love the WTO, Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct.
1999, at 79.
62. Africa Policy Information Center, AIDS Drug Policy, Africa News
Service, Sept. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25944377.
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A. HIV/AIDS in South Africa
With a population of roughly 26 million people, South Africa
is also home to approximately three million reported cases of
HIV/AIDS. 6 With 1,500 new cases emerging every day, by the
year 2005, almost 20% of the workforce is predicted to be infected
with the virus. ' These numbers are staggering, and the burden
this will place on the already strained health care system in South
Africa may destroy it. Simple and generally inexpensive drugs,
such as AZT, which can halt the transmission of AIDS from
mothers to their unborn children, are priced out for reach of many
people in South Africa.65 Doctors often do not even tell their
patients about the medicines that exist, because few of the
infected South Africans can afford them.6 U.S. Surgeon General
David Sacher has compared the current African AIDS crisis to the
Black Death that swept Europe five hundred years ago."
B. The Medicines Act
In response to the incredible need for medical treatments to
its population, the South African Parliament passed in 1997 the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act Amendments."
Included in this bill, specifically section 15C, were provisions for
parallel importing, compulsory licensing, and a clause that over-
rules patent rights that prevent South African companies from
developing local versions of effective treatments. 69
This legislation was met by strong opposition from the U.S.
and European pharmaceuticals industries and their governments.7 °
The U.S. government went to the WTO on behalf of its pharma-
ceutical industry to try to enforce U.S patent rights, and even
imposed sanctions on some South African goods to further em-
phasize U.S. displeasure with the Medicines Act.7' Additionally,
the U.S. government places South Africa on the "Special 301"
63. AIDS Crisis Predicted for South African Work Force, BALTIMORE SUN,
Jan. 28, 1999 at 17A.
64. Id.
65. Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Mutume, supra note 6.
69. Marby, supra note 4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
20001
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watch list, which imposes increased governmental scrutiny
regarding trading practices.'
Under pressure from the WTO and lobbying from Vice-
President Gore and the rest of the U.S. Government, the South
Africans agreed to rework the offending sections of their
Medicines Act early in the year 2000 . In exchange, the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry plans to withdraw a suit they had filed in
the Constitutional Court in South Africa." Although the exact
details of what the new South African law will contain have not
emerged, the Parliament has promised to honor its intellectual
property obligations as put forward under TRIPS.75 It remains
unclear what actions South Africa will take in the year 2000 in
order to modify the Medicines Act, especially in light of the
Seattle WTO meeting in late 1999, the details of which remain
unavailable at the time this comment was published. It is possible
that the South African government will not put forward another
version of the Act in light of the pressure exerted by the U.S.
government.
IV. Applying Bolar to TRIPS
Writing a Bolar-type amendment into the TRIPS Treaty
could accomplish several goals; First, pharmaceutical drugs could
be made available to South African HIV and AIDS patients years
earlier than would otherwise be the case. Second, international
opposition could be muted about the TRIPS-legality of the
American Bolar Amendment. Finally, the corrosive influence of
72. Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 62. "Special 301" is a
section of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 which requires the United States Trade
Representative to monitor the actions of a targeted country carefully to ensure
full compliance with trade regulations. This is a punitive act that demonstrates
U.S. displeasure with the actions of a country and may be the precursor to trade
sanctions. Cf. PhRMA, Issues and Policies at http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/
nte-pub.html (last modified Feb. 16, 1999).
73. Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 62; see also Mutume, supra
note 6.
74. Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 62; see also Amy Stilwell,
Tom Tripp, Helaine Klasky, U.S. South Africa Understanding on Intellectual
Property at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/09/99-76.html (last modified Sept.
17, 1999) This press release from the U.S. Trade Representative announces an
agreement between the U.S. and South Africa to recognize the TRIPS agreement
while working towards providing health care for HIV infected South Africans.
Little detail was included in the article that may explain how this will be
accomplished except to say that the Medicines act will be implemented in a
manner consistent with international intellectual property obligations.
75. Id.
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many countries unilaterally violating the TRIPS treaty could be
avoided, and the integrity of the agreement as an effective
mechanism for intellectual property rights enforcement can be
preserved.
Applying the Bolar Amendment to the TRIPS treaty is based
on the premise that current intellectual property protections
systems are, in the long term, beneficial to developing and less
developed countries. Many people do not feel, however, that
poorer nations should be obliged to recognize the same level of
patent protection as developed nations.76 Proponents of this view
reject the notion that LDCs need "strong, nineteenth-century-type
patent protection.",7  Those who have advocated relaxing patent
restrictions on LDCs and poorer countries envision an economic
benefit for them by influencing industries to produce low cost
versions of products they need.8
While this approach seems to ignore the possibility of harm to
industries in developed nations, the need to maintain the integrity
of international patent systems and harmonize the patent
protection regimes of many nations under TRIPS is paramount.
Even disregarding the social pressures, the domestic economic and
political incentives for LDCs to flout international patents and
build viable domestic industries may become difficult to discount.
Action now can prevent counties like South Africa from feeling
the need to abrogate patent protections in the future.
One of the goals of global patent protection is the
harmonization of the intellectual property laws around the world.
The root of this movement came directly from an international
conference in Los Angeles in 1989, when the importance of
establishing a worldwide framework was examined.79
76. J.H. Reichman, Compliance With The TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to
a Scholarly Debate, supra note 60 (introducing a panel of lecturers at an
international intellectual property symposium at the Annual Meeting of the
Intellectual Property Section, American Association of Law Schools (AALS),
San Antonio, Texas, on January 4, 1996. Several of the lecturers discussed the
inherent unfairness of requiring LDCs to essentially forego developing their own
industries in fields like pharmaceuticals because of strong international patents
that keep them out of the market) (hereinafter Compliance with TRIPS).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Harold C. Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang- Obligations for Domestic
Reform, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535, 540 (1996) (describing a meeting of the
American Intellectual Property Association, in which the Association produced
many ideas that have since been passed into law, most notably the twenty year
patent period that is a cornerstone of the TRIPS agreement).
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A. The Indian Model
For many less developed parts of the world, including South
Africa, the path followed by India has been a model for
establishing patent protection systems responsive to the needs of
developing countries. Although based on the English patent
system, the Indians have developed their own patent system that
has been modified to suit the needs of their population.' India is
comparable to South Africa for the purposes of comment due to
the presence in both countries of stratified social structures, large
numbers of uninsured poor and a highly educated, technologically
advanced elite. Like South Africa, India has struggled with the
problem of providing medicines to their populations while
maintaining patent systems acceptable to their trading partners.81
Since Independence in 1947 from British rule, India has seen
its pharmaceutical industry explode, growing into a multibillion-
dollar enterprise.8 The local companies have evolved from basic,
low-tech operations into some of the world's leading, most highly
competitive pharmaceutical powerhouses.' Most analysts credit
this, in large part, to the almost complete absence of pharma-
ceutical patent protection for many years. '
As recently as the 1960s, the Indian drug market, much like
the South African market today, was almost completely
dominated by foreign companies." However, by refusing to join
the Paris Convention (protecting industrial designs and processes)
and designing patent laws that rejected protection for pharma-
ceutical products, India changed their country into a hotbed of
domestic production.'
80. B.K. Keayla, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry,
Intellectual Property Rights, 151 (1994).
81. See generally, Compliance with TRIPS, supra note 76.
82. Shivlanand Kanavi, Leaders in Technology, Bus. India, July 1994.
83. Martin J. Adelman, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the
TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 526
(1996) (discussing the impacts that the lack of Indian pharmaceutical patent
protection has had on the development of Indian drug companies, noting that
they have grown and become competitive, but have failed to innovate)
(hereinafter "India").
84. Id.
85. Id. (describing ninety percent of the Indian pharmaceutical market as
being controlled by foreign companies who dominate both the retail and bulk
markets).
86. Id. at 520 (describing the Indian patent system that gave preference to
domestic patent applications).
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Enacting legislation similar to the South African Medicines
Act, the Indian government passed the Drug Price Control
Order.' This act placed both price and production controls on
drugs, and required local production of life-saving drugs.' This
protection by the government gave the Indians an opportunity to
focus their industry on diseases affecting their population, rather
than on those diseases that affect Western nations. By the mid-
1990s, the Indian pharmaceutical industry had become a net
exporter of drugs, focusing on lower margin markets such as the
former Soviet states, developing nations and, not surprisingly,
South Africa.89
This model of self-sufficiency must be appealing to a country
like South Africa, which is struggling as it tries to find drugs to
combat a growing AIDS crisis. However, it is important to note
that India was able to develop its pharmaceutical industry by
abstaining from international patent and trade agreements. India
is now a member of the WTO and a signatory nation to TRIPS,
which will compel changes in its patent protections. 90
87. Martin J. Adelman, India, supra note 83, at 526. The Drug Price Control
Order was designed to protect consumers from high prices. It divided all drugs
into four categories:
1. life saving (i.e. treatments for malaria, tuberculosis and leprosy-all
required by the National Health Program)
2. essential
3. less-essential
4. non-essential
Price controls were imposed for the first three categories, with production
incentives provided for local producers.
88. Id.
89. India, supra note 83, at 527. India has focused on mass production of
generic drugs, which are ideally suited for these markets. India's contribution to
the international drug market has come in the form of increases in process
efficiency, not from the development of new medicines.
90. TRIPS Treaty, supra note 22, art 27, "Patentable Subject Matter", in
pertinent part:
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below, patents shall be
available for any invention, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65,
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced.
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
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B. Enhancing Generic and Local Drug Availability
Applying a Bolar-type amendment to the TRIPS treaty would
bring affordable drugs to the people of South Africa at least two
years before they would be available under the current scheme.9
The savings, especially to cash starved states like South Africa,
would be tremendous. Considering the expected numbers of
patients in the coming decades, the savings could reach into the
tens of millions of dollars.
C. Preserving the Integrity of TRIPS
A key aspect of the Bolar Amendment in the United States is
that it is only applicable to the pharmaceutical industry. The
expansion of the Bolar Amendment to TRIPS would in effect
limit the pressure on the treaty as a whole that the South African
Medicines Act has placed on it. Many developing countries have
felt that they have been unfairly burdened by the terms of the
TRIPS agreement and often have done little to prevent wide-
spread violation of international patent laws within their borders.
An expansion of Bolar to TRIPS would carve out exceptions for
the most pressing humanitarian and health concerns, while
removing the incentive to abrogate the treaty in part or in its
entirety by poorer nations. Removing an important and politically
volatile incentive to exercise the national emergency exception
built into TRIPS will also help ensure that many nations will
comply with the treaty that otherwise would not.
A reduction in the years that a pharmaceutical patent is
protected by TRIPS could also play an important part in restoring
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans and animals;
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms.. .However,
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either
by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof. The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall
be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the
agreement....
91. See Roche Prods., v. Bolar Pharm. Co., supra note 55 (describing the
time needed by generic drug companies to fully develop a new drug as two years)
While this holding reffered to the time needed to complete research required by
the FDA, and no doubt this process would be expedited in places like South
Africa, the incredible complexity of the new generation of AIDS therapies will
likely take years to master absent licensing.
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confidence and compliance to this part of the TRIPS Agreement.
A twenty-year term of pharmaceutical patent protection under
TRIPS could be reduced for to twelve or fifteen years. The
shorter the patent, the greater the number of lives that would be
able to be saved in the poorer parts of the world. A reduced
patent protection period would still ensure that drug companies
receive sufficient returns on their investments (through ten or
fifteen year limited monopolies) that they will continue to support
the capital-intensive research which produces innovative
medicines like the new AIDS drugs.
With a Bolar amendment to the TRIPS treaty and a twelve
year patent period, infected patients in South Africa would have
access to affordable medicines approximately ten years earlier
than they do now (assuming the two year development period for
generics). Additionally, the South African population would
provide another market for the pharmaceutical industry where
there currently is none. By denying the South African population
medicines at prices they can afford, the pharmaceutical industry is
foregoing possible profits and risking another round of unilateral
action by the South African Parliament in coming years.
D. Eliminating International Opposition to Bolar Amendment
Since its introduction, the Bolar amendment has been
attacked abroad for being hypocritical and violating the TRIPS
agreement. Criticism has focused on American demands for strict
compliance by all WTO nations to the TRIPS agreement yet, at
home, the U.S. modifies pharmaceutical patents to save money
and increase drug availability. This criticism has taken on new
meaning in light of the South African situation. The inclusion of a
Bolar Amendment in the TRIPS treaty will silence much of this
opposition, while preserving the massive savings that the
American public and government reaps by the widespread and
early availability of generic drugs.
D. Eliminating the Freerider Problem
The economic concept of the freerider describes the ability of
some participants in the marketplace to benefit from the actions of
others without having to contribute to the production of that
benefit. Critics of countries that refuse to enforce patent rights
have often focused on this premise, arguing that actions like South
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Africa's Medicines Act will ultimately harm the world
community.2
Critics of the Medicines Act can point to the lack of patent
protection and the likelihood of reduced drug prices as disin-
centives to further invest in pharmaceutical research.93 Unilateral
actions, like those in South Africa, expose the international patent
protection system to destabilizing forces that it could do well to
avoid. By extending a Bolar-type amendment to TRIPS, it would
be possible to avoid one of the most politically popular reasons for
abrogating trade obligations. The experiences in India show that
there was little innovation made by their drug companies, and that
the low prices created by the Indians may have discouraged
foreign pharmaceutical interests from paying to research diseases
that were prevalent in India.'
While it is true that the Bolar Amendment has caused
decreased research spending to a certain extent in the United
States, the negative effects have been minimal and have not
affected the advancement of pharmaceutical science. The key to
the effectiveness of a Bolar-type amendment would be that it is
limited to pharmaceuticals; poorer nations would thus not be able
to use a medical crisis as a reason to leave the WTO and impose
protectionist policies. In this sense, the pharmaceutical industry
can act as a lynchpin for the TRIPS treaty by either ensuring
stability of the whole by providing flexibility or by allowing the
whole structure to collapse, as countries like South Africa may
pull out to provide ample medicines to their ailing populations.
Patent laws have historically been territorial, having legal
effects only within the borders of the country that creates them.
But the new system of trade, embodied in the WTO and TRIPS
Agreement, is inherently international and hyper-territorial. Only
by protecting a nation's ability to safely include their products in
trade and recognizing that their patents will be honored will the
system work correctly.
92. E.g. India, supra note 83, at 510-511.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 527, 528 (illustrating how government mandated research programs
have produced little discovery of new medicines. However, as foreign markets
become more important to Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers, change I
occurring as more capital has become available and the Indian companies are no
longer prohibited from importing technology to aid in their research. This
indicates that a free marketplace, with appropriate patent protection, will
produce better scientific results than government regulated research and
development).
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V. Conclusion
The need to protect the pharmaceutical industry is important.
The capital-intensive research they undertake is made possible by
the huge rewards the development of a successful drug guarantees.
That interest must be balanced, however, with the need to make
available life-saving medicines to countries like South Africa who
are suffering massive public health crises. In order to continue to
promote the stability of the world trading system and the integrity
of intellectual property rights around the world, basic human
needs must be addressed. Few nations will adhere to a trading
system that is potentially killing millions of its citizens.
Recognizing the moral responsibility to protect human life
does not completely blind us to the benefits of trade-nor should
it. The ability of industries to produce (at great expense) the
innovative medicines that save millions of lives must also be
protected. Redefining the TRIPS treaty in this one area,
pharmaceuticals, can add both the stability and integrity to the
trading system that the West desires and the reasonable access to
new medicines that the people of South Africa and elsewhere
need. The long-term benefits of modifying TRIPS with a Bolar-
style amendment would accrue to people around the world for
years to come.
Matthew Kramer
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